In the context of Romania's macroeconomic and agricultural transformation, this paper analyses the current extent of the depth of rural finance and discusses the implications for the future development of rural financial markets in Romania. The overall agricultural support system is reviewed with particular emphasis on mechanisms of rural finance. The paper argues that building an efficient rural finance system that addresses the financial needs of private sector agriculture and the rural clientele requires a multi-level approach: Innovations are needed at the finance system level, involving, in particular, the creation of an effective regulatory and supervisory framework and making the National Bank of Romania (the central bank) independent of Government interference, at the level of financial organisations, in the processing and administration of financial services and in product design.
Introduction
The successful reform of financial systems in formerly centrally planned economies (CPE) of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) is of fundamental importance to the economic transition of these regions. Moreover, their integration into the world economy makes the efficient functioning of a domestic financial system all the more crucial (ERBD, 1996; Davis and Hare, 1997; Heidhues, 1995b) . The most important functions of a financial system in market economies are: 1) provision of an efficient medium of exchange, 2) mobilisation and allocation of resources including information, 3) risk pooling, 4) exercising financial discipline over enterprises, and 5) providing a framework for policy instruments to stabilise the economy.
The financial intermediaries inherited from the central planning era were not suited to these tasks. In Romania, financial systems development (since 1990) suffered from a number of problems: banks continued to finance loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOE), most notably in agriculture. Banks also carried forward large bad loan portfolios and did not effectively control corporate governance and policy.
The level of financial 'deepening' is a measure of the effectiveness and efficiency of a formal financial market. It indicates the range and diversity of financial instruments and organisations to which the domestic clientele may have access. Indicators of financial deepening may be defined along three broad lines: 1) the monetarization of the economy, 2) the density of formal financial organisations (number per 10,000 persons) and 3) the quantity, variety, quality and efficiency of the financial instruments/ services.
The 'deeper' the financial system, the larger its potential contribution to economic development. Nevertheless, even with a widespread and dense financial organisation network offering a well developed range of financial services, there may be demand side based access constraints which can hamper economic development.
Within the context of Romania's macroeconomic and agricultural transformation, this paper analyses the extent of rural financial deepening and discusses the implications for the future development of the rural financial market in Romania.
Agricultural transformation during transition
For Romania, the worst decline in GDP was in 1991, of 12.9%. However, by 1995 Romanian GDP had grown by 6.9% on the previous year (see Table 4 .1). During 1996 average unemployment was still high at around 8% but falling, reaching 7% in April 1997. Inflation remains a significant problem in Romania. In 1996, the cumulative inflation rate was 56.9%, by March 1997 cumulative inflation had already reached 76.5%. The average monthly inflation rate in 1997 for food items was around 22% (NBR, 1997b) . 1 Overall, however, one can argue that in 1997 Romania's economy is gradually beginning to stabilise because inflation decreased to 6.9% in April and 4.3% in May as compared to the average monthly rates of 25.5% during the first quarter of the year.
Changes in the agricultural structure
Throughout the CEE, privatisation was a top priority. In Romania, for example, the decision to privatise agriculture was the first one made after the revolution of 1989. Besides privatisation, the restructuring of farm enterprises was considered crucial for an efficient agricultural transformation (see Davis 1997) . The current farm structure in Romania has the following features:
• state farms that were converted into so-called commercial companies (according to the Law on the Restructuring of State-Owned Companies 15/1990);
• farmer associations with legal status and family associations without legal status that own property rights on the land operated. Associations without legal status seem to be a transitional phenomenon towards farming associations, or individual private farming;
• individual private farms whose new owners decided to cultivate their land individually (in addition to the mountain farmers who where not collectivised or pressed into cooperatives).
Private farm enterprises operate 86% of the arable land and contribute around 80% to the agricultural production of Romania (Heidhues 1995a) . The majority of private Romanian farmers (2.8 million) are faced with a small average farm size of 2.2 ha as to date the land market has not developed sufficiently (see Table 2 .1). Furthermore, existing legislation still inhibits private farmers from owning more than 10 ha (although this may be increased to 50 ha during 1997) and renting more than 100 ha. Land owners are required by law to hold their land under cultivation, otherwise they will be expropriated after two years. The Land Law 18/1991 had reconstituted the property rights relatively quickly, but the distribution of legal land titles was slower than expected, with only 40% of the small private farmers having a legal title (Heidhues 1995a; Toderiu 1997) .
A land lease law was introduced in 1994 (No.16), but according to the Ministry of Agriculture, a relatively free land market is to be introduced during 1997. Nevertheless, with respect to farm land, restrictions will be applied to ensure that its exploitation remains in the agricultural sector. About 55% of the arable land that is farmed by producer associations is owned by absent urban landowners. Source: Toderiu (1997) .
In 1996, around 11.3 million Romanians were in the labour-force. Of this around 28% are employed in agricultural production or related enterprises. About 40% of the private farmers will go into retirement within the next five years. However, qualified successors are rare.
Overall, agriculture's share of employment has increased since 1989 for the following reasons:
• the agricultural sector is assuming the role of an employment buffer,
• the voluntary return of workers of rural origin.
Until 1996, farmers were required to contract their production to economic agents qualified by the state, i.e. State 'integrators' or intermediaries. In 1995 the proportion of the total harvest which had to be contracted at controlled prices depended on the product grown and was 40% for bread quality wheat, seed wheat and 90% for seed maize. 2 The state farms, also addressed as commercial companies which normally contract with integrators have maintained their fertiliser input at 70% of the pre-transition level, while total consumption in 1993 declined to 28% of 1989 levels. Thus, as concerns access to input and output marketing structures, the former state farms enjoy de facto competitive advantages. This competitive advantage also applies to producer associations, but not to private individual farms.
Agricultural finance
During the period 1993-1996, mandated lending was the predominant agricultural finance mechanism in Romania. 3 The administration used a variety of funds and credit delivery mechanisms to provide the agricultural sector with low cost credit, where principal as well as interest rates were subsidised. The main source of funds were the: (1) state budget, (2) National Bank of Romania (NBR) (3) Private Ownership Fund (POF) 4 proceeds, and (4) deposits in commercial banks (Tesliuc, 1996) .
A widespread-and probably correct-view maintains that the beneficiaries of these cheap funds were a special class of borrowers, notably state-owned farms, large-scale borrowers, and clients with strong lobbying powers and close ties to the banking system. Credit channelled through the integrator system, where access is linked to output marketing through a marketing integrator, is difficult to quantify. Most funds were channelled into agriculture through:
1) NBR refinancing facilities and state budget. NBR lends at preferential rates to commercial banks with profit margins subject to restrictions (around 5% according to decree 440/1992). Interest rates often were below market rates and generally negative in real terms. The borrowers' interest payment was subsidised, either
• ad-valorem, where a certain percentage of the interest cost is covered by a subsidy, usually 60%; or
• variable, where the borrower's interest is fixed at a certain level, usually 15%, and the subsidy covers the difference up to the sum of preferential rate and bank margin.
2) State-owned commercial banks and state guarantees. Within the subsidized lending procedures to agriculture described in point 1, loans were extended to often high risk borrowers. These loans were extended primarily by state-owned commercial banks and insured with state guarantees from the Ministry of Finance. Besides the interest subsidy to these borrowers the state also covered loan defaults.
3) Private Ownership Fund (POF) . Proceeds that were lent at zero interest rate to stateowned agricultural enterprises.
The costs of the Government mandated lending has been a heavy burden on the state budget and also the NBR's balance sheet, as some lending mechanisms required the NBR to cover the interest subsidies. Moreover, the administering commercial banks also lost money because they could not apply their usual profit margin. This has led to an erosion of the financial intermediaries' lending portfolio and capital base. These massive quasi fiscal transfers (QFT) to agriculture (see Table 2 .2) went to state-owned enterprises (more than 80%). Private farmers were receiving on average about 20% of the transfers over the period of 1993 to 1996 (see Table 2 .3). Small private farmers received just 2% of the agricultural credit funds administered by Banca Agricola (BA) which has been allocating about 90% of all agricultural credit in Romania.
NBR lending at preferential interest rates, intermediated primarily by BA, includes a clear fiscal subsidy. Therefore, the Government used the NBR to channel implicit, non-budgeted, non-transparent state subsidies to the agricultural sector avoiding the more transparent State budget. These subsidies in form of the QFT have had a distortive impact on resource allocation, enterprise efficiency and macroeconomic performance (Davis and Hare, 1997) .
The subsidised credit was a life-support mechanism for the unreformed state-owned farms and marketing systems rather than a growth inducing real capital formation mechanism for either the state-owned or private farm enterprises (Perotti and Carare 1996) . On average, the quasi-fiscal transfers accounted for 0.8% of GDP from 1993 to 1996, rising from 0.5% in 1993 to 1.5% in 1996. Source: Tesliuc (1996) .
If we consider both the quasi-fiscal transfers through the Romanian lending programme mentioned above and the direct State subsidies to agriculture, the volume of transfers to agriculture accounted for 2 to 4% of GDP and 11 to 21% of gross value added in agriculture, from 1993 to 1996 (see Table 2 .4). While public spending on agriculture compares easily with the public expenditures for human capital development, such as education (3-4% of GDP) and health (2.7-3.1% of GDP), its effect has mainly been to sustain inefficiency and block structural change in Romania's state agriculture sector. The incidence of public spending on private agriculture has remained small. Source: Excerpt from Davis and Hare (1997) .
Romanian financial system before and after liberalisation
During central planning, a single bank carried out the functions of both, central and commercial banking. The monobank system was typically supplemented by specialised banks, including a national savings bank, a foreign exchange bank, and an agricultural development bank. These banks had little capital and neither selected investments nor monitored them.
They provided rudimentary and generally limited services to their customers (Davis and Hare, 1997) . The Government absorbed all risk and did not monitor any of the financial intermediaries. At the outset of the transformation, the monobank system has been dismantled and the former specialised banks now operate as universal commercial banks (Davis and Hare, 1997; Giassemi, 1997) . Accordingly, during the CPE era, the Romanian formal financial market comprised the following state-owned banks:
(1) Bank for Agriculture and Food Industry Bank (BAFI), now called Banca Agricola Romania's banking sector currently consists of private and five primarily state-owned banks; the latter comprise BA, RDB, RBFT, RCB, and the Savings House (CEC) that had exactly 2,200 branches, sub-branches and agencies in August 1997 (CEC, 1997) . These banks demonstrate a number of weaknesses that are associated with the fact that they had previously played no genuine intermediation function: significant amounts of bad debts, lack of skills and often poor management, and little loan portfolio diversification (Davis and Hare, 1997; Giassemi, 1997) . The current draft law on bank privatisation covers the (1) privatisation of state-owned banks, (2) restructuring the NBR and the (3) liquidation of banks by court order (Romaniabusiness, 1997) .
In early 1997, the NBR reported 20 licensed banks, 21 if CEC is included (NBR, 1997a; Pantazescu, 1997) . Since January 1997, CEC is registered in the banking register of the NBR, although it has not yet received a formal banking license. Banca Albina that was originally founded in 1872 as an agricultural commercial bank closed during the socialist era, reopened in January 1996 and plans to engage in rural investments. Nevertheless, the major universal bank addressing the agricultural sector is BA. It was established in 1948 and transformed in a joint stock company in 1990. Government and the five POFs hold 57% and 26% of the share capital of the bank respectively. There are no other shareholders in excess of two percent of the capital. During 1996, around 80% of Lei 4,000 billion were pumped into the agricultural sector, largely out of money creation of NBR. This has been the prime cause of inflationary pressures within the economy. Only 2% of the loans allocated to agriculture by BA went to small private farmers, the remainders to state-owned agricultural producers and the food processing industry (Davis and Hare, 1997; Heidhues 1995a ).
In addition, there are 842 credit co-operatives (CCs) that have survived the socialist era.
Their savings mobilisation and credit extension capabilities are limited by the extremely constraining co-operative and banking regulations. Also an efficient market integration through its union, CentroCOOP, is not yet given. Nevertheless, about 8% of the rural credit portfolio is extended by CCs to primarily small private rural enterprises (Davis and Hare 1997) . The CCs together with the consumer co-operatives are cofounders and shareholders of the Banca de Credit Co-operatist (Bankco-op). In 1994 they held together around 45% of the share capital. Theoretically, CCs can refinance themselves through loans from Bankco-op to market conditions; in practice, Bankco-op is very reluctant to grant loans to the CCs.
Rural financial deepening in Romania
How suited is Romania's financial system to rural clients' needs? The efficiency and effectiveness of a formal financial market can be described by financial deepening indicators such as the (1) monetarization of the economy; (2) number of formal financial organisations;
and (3) the quantity and quality of financial services. In the following, these indicators are applied to Romania's rural financial market.
Monetarisation of the economy
The monetarisation of the economy at the macro level measured by M2/GDP is a first indicator of the financial depth of an economy and of the financial system's efficiency in mobilising funds to foster economic growth. The indicator M2/GDP shows that Romania's financial depth is far less than what would reasonably be expected for countries with a similar level of GNP (see Table 3 .1). The negative real deposit interest rate that prevailed until 1997
provided little incentive to save in the domestic financial system. The prevailing tendency was to retain financial savings either as foreign exchange or to invest them in real assets.
In order to attract savings NBR raised the auction rate for banks to 266.7% in March 1997 which had reduced currency in circulation significantly by April 1997. The inter-bank interest rate increased subsequently to 123.1% (March) and the time deposit rate for non-bank clients rose above 100%. As a result, savings deposits at banks increased rapidly; by May 1997, the population had deposited between US-$ 200-500 million in the Romanian financial market (Embassy of Romania, 1997). Among them were many members of CCs who had shifted their co-operative savings with CCs to commercial banks. If this period of high interest rates had continued, the deterioration of the CCs' liability side through dissaving could have had severe consequences on the sustainability of many CCs. 
Financial density in rural areas
NBR estimates that there are 135 rural subsidiaries (filial) and 146 agencies that offer financial services predominately to the rural clientele. The total number of subsidiaries and agencies is 921 (see Table 3 .2). The 281 rural subsidiaries and agencies operate in locations with a population smaller than 10,000 persons. Relating the number of rural banking outlets to the labour force employed in agriculture, this would account to roughly 1.3 financial intermediaries per 10,000 persons employed in agriculture. This is above Romania's overall financial density of 1.2 banking outlets per 10,000 persons in the labour force. It indicates that the rural financial institution network in terms of banking outlets is comparatively well developed, although there are vast regional differences. Although their contribution to the rural finance market up to 1997 was below 10%, it has to be kept in mind that CCs are not included in this calculation. Davis and Hare (1997) point out that with greater financial market liberalisation, BPST and CEC may be expected to become major players in rural finance.
Quality, variety and efficiency of financial services
The participation or non-participation of small private enterprises in the formal financial market is determined by both latent and active variables. A latent variable would be the decision of a potential investor to refrain from approaching a financial intermediary because of the assumption that he will not obtain the desired service.
Active variables determining a potential investor's decision to participate in the financial market may be grouped as: 1) the investor's characteristics, 2) financial market's characteristics, and 3) complementary institutions' characteristics.
Investor
Personal and business characteristics of a potential investor influence not only the lenders' decision to engage in a contractual arrangement but also the investors' decision to participate in the financial market. Empirical research elsewhere has shown that a low level of education can act as a financial market entry barrier given the complexity of financial transactions (Schrieder, 1996) . Also, only 40% of the small private farmers in Romania have a legal document demonstrating their property rights. Lacking such documents, potential borrowers may consider it useless to approach a financial institution. Moreover, it appears that even property certificates may not be accepted as loan security. The only collateral acceptable by commercial banks presently are owned and insured real estate. Romanian banks ought to consider alternative collateral schemes, e.g., as in Croatia and Poland where banks are permitted to use assets such as stocks and equipment as security, similar to pawnbrokers (World Bank, 1996) . Also, persons seeking external finance may estimate their capacity to repay a loan as risky, facing insecure market prices for their produce. The three Cs of a debtor: character, collateral and the capacity to repay based on personal and business characteristics summarise a potential investor's decision to forward a financial demand towards a financial intermediary.
In 1993, an Euroconsult survey in five CEE countries found that private farmers' perception of their access to the formal credit market is often negative. In Romania, 80% considered access in some form or the other as limited. To a lesser extent this is also true for farm managers. Due to historical events, potential investors may also be suspicious of certain organisational forms of financial intermediaries. This applies to some extent to the CCs which have been misused in the past as tools of the centralist Government apparatus. Within the Timis-survey, individual private farmers' loan portfolio was evaluated. It consists of loans acquired from the formal and the informal financial market, the latter referring to informal financial savings and credit groups (such as the CAR and Roata), the extended family, neighbours and friends. In the Timis county, just 9 (14%) of the 65 interviewed private farmers received a loan (including informal sector loans not covered in Fig. 3.1) during 1996, despite the fact that the need to invest in the productive capital base was obvious and self-financing capacity was limited. The median loan was slightly below US-$ 100, while the average was US-$ 1,500 and the maximum almost US-$ 10,000. The sample distortion occurred due to two formal market loans disbursed by BA. The loan portfolio of the individual private farmers shows that they primarily rely on the informal financial market.
Also, the Timis data demonstrate that small private farmers do save, preferably in hard foreign currency such as Dollars and DM. These savings are mostly kept at home. Farmers were reluctant to give any indication of the amount of foreign exchange savings retained. Only 30% (N = 19) reported having savings accounts with local financial organisations, mostly with BA (52 %) and CEC (21%). In this case too, several farmers (N = 6) refused to indicate the savings balance. For those in the sample providing data the average and median savings amount was US-$ 907 and US-$ 856, respectively.
Financial market
Frequently, the lack of local formal financial intermediaries inhibits potential investors from participating in the formal financial market. This is particularly frequent in rural areas. Rural financial intermediaries may discourage small private entrepreneurs from becoming their customers due to three major constraints: (1) information asymmetries between market participants (client ↔ agent), (2) lack of suitable collateral, and (3) as a result, high transaction costs. Innovative forms of contractional arrangements and organisations can circumvent or ease these constraints of efficient financial intermediation.
Imperfect information at the financial agent level about the ability and willingness of potential borrowers to honour the debt payment schedule leads to problems in three areas (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990) : screening, incentive, and enforcement.
Innovative financial organisations attempt to overcome these problems by demanding collateral substitutes which they can seize in the case of loan default such as:
• tied contracts (specific credit cum labour, cum land, or cum marketing arrangements) or leasing arrangements;
• third-party guarantees (as practised in Albania the Foundation for Enterprise Finance and Development);
• stocks and equipment as security similar to leasing arrangements (Croatia, Poland); and
• threat of loss of access to future borrowing opportunities (World Bank, 1996) . Throughout CEE, banks often regard collateral in the farming sector as inadequate. This is partly due to slow progress made in reforming agricultural property rights and land titling.
Commercial banks are generally wary of involvement in subsidized lending schemes or guarantee funds as they have to assume some of the risk. Thus, farmers and agri-processors are mainly confined to dealing with State banks, in the case of Romania the BA. While BA provides subsidized loans to agriculture, it is only able to sustain this as long as the government uses it as a conduit for subsidies.
The third major impediment to increased access to credit and savings services are transaction costs (TCs) which are either incurred by the financial intermediary delivering the service or by the enterprise (household) demanding the service, or both. TCs include any costs involved in an exchange of assets or services other than the price of the asset or service. High TCs due to information asymmetry appear to be less of a hindrance in networks of close social interaction, e.g. in self-help group-based systems, such as the CAR or Roata in Romania.
In many CEE countries, the financial system's legal and policy framework discriminates indirectly against small-scale rural entrepreneurs. Often, the policy of subsidised lending to rural priority sectors, such as agricultural production, storage and processing, leads to adverse selection phenomena, namely the selection of large-scale enterprises with a high degree of moral hazard. In Romania, credit is mainly allocated to heavily indebted and inefficient agricultural state enterprises that are incapable of repayment. Tesliuc (1997) estimates a 30% loan default in agriculture vis-à-vis 10% in other sectors in Romania.
The management structure of financial intermediaries is often ill-suited to business requirements in rural areas. In Romania as in other CEE countries, transactions, particularly larger credit activities, are still centralised leading to long delays between a credit application and approval. Frequently, the processing procedures of financial services in banking enterprises are non-transparent, complicated and expensive. This tends to drive potential investors away from the formal financial market as a possible source of finance; if accessible investors rather turn to foreign sources.
The services offered by financial intermediaries frequently do not reflect real demand. Deposit schemes lack flexibility and depositing and withdrawal are often expensive and subject to limitations or minimum requirements. The same frequently applies to credit schemes. Also, the managerial capability of loan department officials is often unsatisfactory. More flexibility and better demand orientation of financial services could enhance the participation of private rural enterprises in the formal financial market. An array of innovative approaches is being tested.
Complementary institutions
Financial markets in transition economies, particularly in rural areas, lack many features that are taken for granted in most industrial countries. A poorly developed communication and transportation infrastructure makes the use of formal financial services costly for potential customers. The virtual absence of insurance markets, e.g. crop and weather insurance, to mitigate the problems of income uncertainty hinders financial intermediation.
At the sectoral level, insufficient land and lease markets, distorted input-output markets and the lack of extension for private farmers reduce the capability and willingness of potential investors and creditors alike to engage in financial transactions (Heidhues, 1995a) . These constraints weigh heavily as in Romania about 86% of the arable land is privately owned. In Timis, 35% of the arable land is cultivated by farming associations and 65% by small-scale family farms. Yet, less than half of the private landowners have received a legal land title, that could be used as credit collateral. Small-scale farming still dominates because land lease only became possible in 1994. An effective land market is still to be introduced. These policies are crucial to transforming Romanian agriculture from its present small-scale farming to more efficient structures.
Implications for designing rural financial policies
Given the relatively favourable banking density in Romania there should be sufficient rural financial intermediaries to serve the potential farm and non-farm rural enterprises. Market distortions and the lack of a conducive institutional environment prevents financial intermediaries 5 from servicing small scale private agriculture. They did not develop the variety, quality and efficiency of services to deal with this type of clientele. While the Romanian rural financial market is relatively 'deep' with regard to the number of intermediaries, it is by no means so with regard to its monetarization, service array and outreach.
Therefore, financial intermediaries engaging in rural finance need to adopt financial innovations to become capable of effectively and efficiently supplying their services without external support (Schrieder 1996; Schrieder and Heidhues 1995) . The task lying ahead is considerable. Otiman (1997) estimates in his outlook 2015 that in the mid-term about 1.4 million Romanians will remain in agriculture. To efficiently restructure the agricultural sector given this labour-force he estimated the following annual credit demand until 2015 at current prices (Otiman 1997 ):
• 1.5 thousand billion Lei for land market transactions (500-800 thousand ha per year);
• 3-3.5 thousand billion Lei for investments in tractors and farm machinery (30-35 thousand tractors per year); and
• 10 thousand billion Lei for agricultural production measures (1 million Lei per ha cultivated land).
Clearly, the present structure of the financial system in Romania as well as in other CEE countries cannot cope with this financing task. The agricultural transformation process requires a financial market that is reliable, trustworthy, efficient and geared to serve the new demands of the agricultural and rural clientele. Changes and innovations at four levels are needed:
1) at the macro-finance system level,
2) at the level of financial organisations,
3) in the administration and processing of financial services (savings, credit, insurance and leasing), and 4) in product design (Schrieder and Heidhues 1995; von Stein 1991) .
Improvements in each of these financial innovation categories are needed to facilitate private farmers' and rural people's access to the financial market. They will enhance market integration and expand customer coverage (see Schrieder and Heidhues 1997; Schrieder 1996) .
Financial system innovations
Financial system innovations at the macro level are aimed at creating a reliable, fair and enforceable legal and regulatory framework, standardised accounting procedures together with politically and institutionally independent supervisory bodies whose decisions are strictly enforced. Banking regulations should not just be 'on the books' but forcefully applied. The current draft law on bank privatisation in Romania contains legislation to liquidate banks by court order (Romaniabusines, 1997). Tight on-and off-site supervision must be implemented, sending a strong signal to bankers about the penalties for inappropriate banking behaviour (Fleming et al., 1996) . This is crucial in an environment where there has been (and still is) a close and often cosy relationship between enterprises and banks. Collusion between them (and between banks) can limit market entry and competition. Similarly, corrupt practices must not be tolerated. No other sector in a market economy is so dependent on trust and ethical business practice as the banking sector. At the system level (as at the organisation level) a major institution building and training task lies ahead. This is a process that will require time.
A shock approach would be unrealistic and doomed to failure. In revising and strengthening the legal regulatory and supervisory framework established and generally accepted principles are to be the guide.
At the same time, macro-economic stability is essential for an efficiently functioning financial system. The experience in East Asia, Europe and Latin America has shown that financial crises were invariably associated with macro-economic instability, particularly an appreciation of the real exchange rate and rapid increases in monetary growth (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1995) .
Financial organisation innovations
The term financial organisation innovation refers to changes in the structure, management, and legal form of an institution. Giassemi (1997) 
Administration and processing innovations
Processing innovations focus on improving organisational and service distribution aspects of financial institutions, such as the simplification of financial transactions. A processing innovation in the area of improved marketing would be a participatory client approach (Heidhues 1995b) . To ensure that process innovations are beneficial to the rural poor, the target group ought to be included in the design process of rural institution building (Schrieder and Heidhues 1995) .
Product innovation
Financial product innovations are defined as new or modified financial services that have not existed in the market before or differ substantially from existing ones (von Stein 1991).
Product innovations play a critical role in rural financial engineering that aims at accelerating economic growth (Schrieder 1996; Zeller et al. 1997 ). An often emphasised product innovation is the introduction of flexible savings facilities in rural financial intermediation. At the rural enterprise/household level deposit schemes reduce the risk of seasonal income shortfalls since stress periods can be bridged through dis-saving. Rural finance schemes that offer savings contracts are important in improving the capital and income situation of the rural population (World Bank, 1989 and . The transition of the Romanian Savings House (CEC) into a fully fledged commercial bank may bring about more flexible and profitable savings contracts for its rural clientele.
Conclusions
The building of an efficient and effective rural financial market requires a multifaceted
approach. An essential base requirement is financial discipline and monetary stability. In Romania, as in other CEE countries, this cannot be achieved if the Central Bank under the command of the Government is pushed into financing loss-making state enterprises.
Independence from Government interference of the Central Bank with its key mandate being securing monetary stability is a precondition for effective financial market development. Even if institutional density is well developed, as is the case in Romania, financial innovations are needed at four levels to improve private farmers' and other rural people's access to the financial market:
• at the financial system level in creating a reliable, fair and enforceable regulatory framework with an effective supervisory structure;
• at the organisational level either in restructuring banking institutions to better serve the rural client market or to strengthen existing rural finance institutions, such as the credit co-operatives in Romania, or institute new ones if a reform of existing structures turns out to be not feasible;
• within finance institutions, streamlining application, approval and supervision processes and integrating participatory client involvement, and
• offering new services geared to the needs of the rural clientele.
These are institutional innovations that require a major long-term effort in education, training and gathering experience, in changing laws and restructuring institutions and in redefining responsibilities. Needless to emphasise that this is a longer-term process requiring time and persistence; a shock approach will not succeed. 
